Since Darwin, the idea of intellectual continuitv has grippcd comparative psychology. psychological evilut ion has been viewed as the accumulation of gmdual changes over lirne, resulting in an unbroken chain of mental-capacities throughout the diversity of li/e. Som 
pacities throughout the diversity of li/e. Som Lillie, 1942\ . Yet intuition, which undersrandably s€eks to find continuity, would lead us to believe otherwiseSuch instances of apparent morphological discontinuily are really no mystery; evolution is historical, replete with the errors that history implies. Extinction, coupled with the imperfections and inherent limitations of the fossil record, virtually assures that there will be many instances in which conlemporary diversity will ap pear discontinuous. A cursory examination ofthe major transformations that have occurred in body plans (reflected in the classification oldistinct phyla) is enough to demonstrat€ that discontinuous patlerns do nol neces_ sarily imply discontinuous processes.
Perhaps nowhere in biology is the temptalion to trust intuitions about continuity more seductive than in rhe field of animal behavior and, in particular, with respecl to the issue of in1elkctual continuity. Unlike manv other areas of biology, the history of comparative psyciology has been marked by an inability to meet a cenrral goil of the evolutionary sciences: reconstructing the ti;jng and order in which particular characteristics uppeured duringthe history oflifc. One explanarion for this inabiliry is the charge that psycbologists have adhered to the ..philogenetic scale" instead of treating psychology as pait of the radiation of animals outward in all directions (Hodos & Campbell, 1969) . Others have defended the opposite position, arguing that this is not a failure ofcomparative psychology at all but ratber that our inability to identifv the emergence of interspecific psychological differences reflecb a fundamental reality of nature-namely, that such differences do not exist (see McPhail, 1987 ).
In this articl€ I sketch a pr€liminary synthesis among the fields of evolutionary biology, developmental biology, developmental psychology and epistemology, and comparative psychology in an €ffort to further understand the issue of continuity and discontinuity in psychological evolution. This attempt can be viewed as complementary to Park€r and Gibson's ( 1979) Psychological evolution is a special case in point, but it suffers from the slightly different problem that intuition has led many researchers into seeing continuity connecting most vertebrate forms of life (Darwin, 187 I / 1982a Griffin, 1976; Romanes, 1883) . Part of the reason for this was recognized by Romanes (1882) , who realized that unlike morphological structures, psychological structures are visible only through their "behavioral ambassadors." Thus, identifying the sequence of the evolution ofnovel innovations in psychological traits has been all but impossible because many investigators, looking at the behavioral evidence to date, do not see any instances of stepwise evolutionary innovations (cf. Bitterman, 1975) . This state of affairs can be traced at least to Charles Darwin himself, who believed that anything less than complete intellectual continuity could be used as evidence against his theory of evolution (Darwin, l87l/1982a Darwin (18'7lll982a) (Gould, 1980 In the context of the ape-language experiments, for instance, it was not really the continuity-discontinuity issue that was the root of the field's turmoil. It was the general failure to define language (and experimental methodology) precisely enough to determine where similarities and differences (continuities and discontinuities) existed between ape and human (Premack, 1976 (Premack, , 1986 Premack, 1986.) The same interplay between change and function is true in the context ofpsychological ontogeny as well. To many, the field ofdevelopmental psycholJgy must appear to be a tired, century-long debate between those who see complete continuity in psychological development from birth to adulthood and those who advocate stagelike theories of development (see Brainerd, 1978 Gelman, 1979 Gallup (1982) returned to the issue of psychological discontinuity following his previous discovery that chimpanzees are capable oi.ecognizing themselves in mirrors (Gallup, 1970 (Lethmate & Di.icker, 1973 Gallup, 199 l; Povinelli, l99l) . Gallup (1970 Gallup ( , 1975 Gallup ( ,1977 Desmond, 1979; Eglash & Snowdon, 1983; Fox, 1982) . Others, myself included, have objected to Gallup's interpretation of the negative evidence concerning the failures to find self-recognition in gorillas, lesser apes, and monkeys on strictly logical grounds, arguing that there does not appear to be a necessary reason that self-aware organisms must recognize themselves in mirron (Povinelli, 1987) . Othen have offered explanations for self-recognition that require less ofa self-concept than Gallup implied (Goustard, 1983 ; Jaynes, I97g;
Mitchell, in press). But from the standpoint of intuition, perhaps the most troubling issue concerns the repeated failures to find clear and unambiguous evidence of selfrecognition in most gorillas (Ledbetter & Basen, 1982; Suarez & Gallup, l98l) . This is especially rrue in light of the rather compelling evidence for self-recognition in at least one home-reared gorilla that had been instructed in a version of American Sign language (patterson, 1984; for a discussion, see Povinelli, 1987) . I shall return to this issue in greater detail later.
All along, Gallup acknowledged the potential de- ductive weakness of certain aspects of his arguments (see Gallup, 1977 , as well as Gallup, 1979) . Nonetheless, as the diversity of primate species unsuccessfully tested for self-recognition continued to widen and as the amount of time and techniques used on them increased, Gallup found it difficult to resist the conclusion that a fundamental cognitive difference related to self-conception separated chimpanzees, orangutans, and humans from -5 A case in point is the issue of pretend (or symbolic) play. Early forms of such play emerge at approximately l g monihs ofage, and many researchers have argued that such performance is supporied by some undentanding ofmental representation on the part olthi young pretender (lheneV & Seyfarth, 1990a; Flavell, 1988; Forguson, t9g-9;  Leilie, r9g7).
However, a recent experimental look at young children's undentanding ofpretend play has revealed that although iicertainly requires mental representation to engage in such activities, the children themselves do not understand this until they are approximately five yean ofage (Lillard, in press; for a recent discussion ofthe young chitdis understanding oi pretense, see Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993 (Gallup, 1982 (Gallup, , 1983 (Gallup, , 1985 Povinelli, l99l) . Gallup and Suarez (1986) Premack and Woodruff's (1978) theory-of-mind arricle, the door has been opened for such investigations (for recent reviews of theory-of-mind research in children see Perner, l99l; Wellman, 1990 Gallup, 1985 (Dunn & Dale, 1984; Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 1975; Watson & Fischer, 1980) . This ability presumably underpins young children's ability to engage in a variety of forms of pretend play in which they switch from one social role to another (Mead, 1934) , as well as speech acts in which the child essentially adopts "motherese" (Sachs & Devin, l97q (Premack, 1975; Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Premack & Dasser, 199 l; see also Kohler, 1927 Perner, 199 I for a recent summary of the evidence on this point). Thus, we reasoned that if our nonverbal task was a valid measure of the seeingknowing relationship, then many four-year-olds should perform quite well, whereas most young three-year-olds should not. In order to test this prediction, Sandra deBlois and I tested a number of three-and four-year-old children rr We have undertaken several attempls to falsify our working hypotheses concerning the absence ofrole taking and knowledgc anribution in macaques-For example, we used our role reversal procedures with an adult female rhesus monkey that had lor many years shown evidence of spontaneous pointing, very similar to instances observed in captive chimpanzees. We thus hypothesized that given her "natural" pointing capacities she might, like chimpanzees, comprehend the role reversal task immediately, thus falsifying our species differences hypothesis. However, she did not (Hess, Novak, & Povinelli, in pres).
May 1993 . American Psychologist 50r using procedures closely modeled after the chimpanzee and macaque work described above (povinelli & deBlois, 1992b (povinelli & deBlois, 1992b) . r6 The pattem ofthe four-'€ar-olds. success presenls some difrculties for our working h),pothesis about the chimpanzees, comprehension of the lask. There x€le obvious differences between the chimpanzees and the four-year-olds in the robustness of their performances. Some have argued that this adds support to the leaming theory interpretation of our results (Cheney & Seyfarth, t992) . In fact, rhis conctusion is errooeous. Th€ chirnpanzees were p€rforming at ceiling levels at the conclusion o-fthe experiment (and had been for mosr oathe tesdng). Thus, their performance level (about 70% correcr) was not uniquely eilhined by leaming theory. Leaming theory would have to resori to ;d hoc explanations such as sfrecies differences in short-term memorv recall.
But the very same explanalions could accounl for why an organism operaling with a theory of mind woutd xrform at those leveblThus_ lhis asprct ofth€ chimpanzees' performance is silenr with resf,ect to lhe leaming versus attribution issue. Regardless of whether chimpanzees urdcrstand the seeing-knowing relationship, they ctearly didr from normal children in attentional and emotional domains, ;nd $ese differences may account for lhe problem under either framework. lt is also rmportanl to pornt oul that three_year.olds do nol p€rform betrer when provi_ded repeared rrials such a5 the chrmpsnz€es *€re given (ser povinelli & deBlois. 1992b). Whiren ( l99l) has suggesred thar tie tearnrng aspecs could have been disentangled ifwe (in our transfer rest) had all;we; rhe kno*tr 16 q,631s O"*r bag in a way thal did nol obscure lhe eves In a similar vein. Heyes (in press) has suggesred a conrrol in which rhe kno$rr would rnomenrarily place thr paper bag over his or her head after lhe food is hrdden. However. bolh a pproaches still leave the subjecls wrth a discriminable cue to le:tm lhe distinction instead ofaltrib;ting it. The proper experimental design requlres a large enough sample sizi or cnrmpanzeesto pit a control fl€aming) goup against an experimental (altrrbutron) group (sft Povinelli. 199t & Perner, 1983; Flavell et al., l98l; Flavell, 1986; Perner & Wimmer, 1985; Wimmer et al., 1988 However, simply because self-recognition emerges in children before the onset of many important aspects of self-and social attribr.ition, this in no way invalidates Gallup's ( 1982) proposal. A revised version of the model, and one implied to some extent by Gallup and Suarez sion of Gallup's framework by demonstrating that the emergence of mirror self-recognition seems tightly correlated with the development of behaviors that appear to depend on primitive forms of social attribution (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993; Bischof-Kohler, 1988; Johnson,1982 (Antinucci, 1989, chap. Patterson's (1984) Premack, 1988; Whiten, 1993) . Chimpanzees and the other great apes may either affirm or disappoint those who wish to find other minds as replete with social intelligence as our own. On the other hand, the divenity of minds in the animal kingdom may still surprise those who see the psychological capacities ofthe great apes and humans as fundamentally derived. Resolving these questions will ultimately allow us to appreciate the diversity of ways of knowing about the mental world that evolution has unknowingly produced.
